Ghost buster: The reality of one's own body by De Vignemont, Frédérique
Ghost buster: The reality of one’s own body 121T H E O R I A  E T  H I S T O R I A  S C I E N T I A R U M , V O L .  V I I, No 
E d.  N i c o l a s  C o p e r n i c u s  U n i v e r s i t y  2 0 0 3
Frederique de Vignemont1
Ghost buster: The reality of ones own body
Abstract
What are the epistemic bases of the knowledge of the reality of our own body?
Proprioception plays a primordial role in body representation and more particularly at
the level of body schema. Without proprioception people can feel amputated and the
mislocalization of proprioceptive information through the remapping of the Penfield
Homonculus induces illusions of phantom limbs, illusions that contradictory visual
feedback cannot erase. However, it turns out that it is not as simple as that and that
vision also intervenes in body knowledge: vision of one’s own body allows deafferented
patients to move and phantom limbs to disappear. Finally, the existence of phantom
limbs in aplasic patients as well as studies on neonates provide evidence of an innate
component of body representation.
Descartes applied his systematic doubt on the reality of his own body: nothing
assured him that he had a body, that he was not dreaming or hallucinating its
existence. More recently, Putnam (1981) has suggested that we could be
disembodied brains in a vat and that the experience of our own body could be
the result of electric impulses from a large computer. At the end of their reflections,
Descartes and Putnam refuted skepticism and assumed that people do have bodies.
I do not want to study how they reached this conclusion here, nor to address the
metaphysical question of the reality of the body. Rather, the focus of this paper
will be the epistemological question of the knowledge of body existence: how
do I know that I have a hand rather than that I am amputated? The answer seems
to be obvious, I can see my hand and I can feel it. But it is not always so
1 I would like to thank Shaun Gallagher for his helpful comments.
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obvious, and I’d like to start from certain borderline phenomena in order to
study the respective roles of proprioception and vision in the knowledge of body
existence.
A Questionable Reality of the Body
According to Merleau-Ponty (1962), one of the main features of the body is
its permanency: the body is not an object among others that could leave me or
disappear. He proposes that this permanency is even a metaphysical necessity in
the sense that the permanent body appears as a point of reference in the dynamic
world. It doesn’t mean that the body is always at the core of our attention and
that we are constantly aware of the state of each body part. It only means that
we can hardly deny or forget our own body. But could we say that the knowledge
of body existence is transparent: if I believe that my body exists, does it
necessarily exist and conversely, if my body exists, do I necessarily believe it?
The Disappearance of the Body
In some psychiatric cases, the body is felt as if it is absent: in deperso-
nalization disorder, patients report that they feel as if they are detached from
their body, whereas in Cotard syndrome, they believe that their body is dead and
rotting away. In addition, following an injury of the right parietal cortex, a part
of the body literally disappears from body representation. In hemisomatognosia
or in personal neglect, patients explicitly deny the existence of one side of their
body or forget it (for instance, patients suffering from personal neglect shave or
make up only the right side of their face). Such phenomena could be explained
by a disruption of body representation or by a deficit of attention.
The body can also disappear because of the absence of peripheral information
relative to it. When people are paralytic (lesion of motor and sensory nerves) or
deafferented (lesion of sensory nerves following neuropathy that can extend to
almost the entire body), they receive no proprioceptive and tactile information
about the state of their body and they report that their body appears “as a hole”
as soon as they close their eyes (Berger and Gerstenbrand, 1981). For instance,
G.L., one of these deafferented patients, has no information about her body below
the mouth, except visual information. Consequently, she has to learn to control
her movements only by means of vision, which requires her to always observe
what she is doing. But if she is in the dark, she loses her body: she is no longer
able to move appropriately, and even worse, she feels as if her body has
disappeared. This illusion of an amputation is not so surprising given that, in the
Ghost buster: The reality of one’s own body 123
dark, she doesn’t see her body, she doesn’t feel it, she doesn’t even move it (or
at least, control her movements). But what is more surprising is that some people
can still feel the presence of their limb after it has been amputated, as is the case
in the phenomenon of phantom limb.
The Phantom Body2
“[I was] suddenly aware of a sharp cramp in my left leg. I tried to get at it with my
single arm, but, finding myself too weak, hailed an attendant. ‘Just rub my left
calf,… if you please.’ ‘Calf ?… You ain’t got none, pardner. It’s took off’” (Melzack,
1992, p. 90).
At the beginning, the notion of a phantom limb was only the topic of a short
story written by the neurologist Mitchell. However, beyond fiction, people feel
the presence of absent body parts like their arm, their leg, their breast, their
tooth or even their internal viscera. This sensation is frequent (around 90% of
patients experience a vivid phantom immediately after the loss), can be very
painful and persists from a few days to 60 years. If people were paralyzed before
the operation, they will be unable to move their phantom limb; otherwise, they
can feel phantom movements, voluntary or not. The content of the illusion is
realistic and specific: John felt so vividly that he had grasped a cup with his
phantom arm that he began to scream when the examiner had moved the cup
away from him (Ramachandran and Blakeslee, 1998). People also continue to
feel their wedding ring or can suffer from arthritis in the phantom limb when the
weather is damp and cold, as they suffered before the amputation. Indeed, although
the phantom sensation is related to the memories previous to the amputation, we
should not reduce the phenomenon of phantom limb to the persistency of past
representations of the body. Phantom limbs also appear in people who suffer
from the congenital absence of limbs (aplasia).3 The representation of the phantom
body in aplasic people cannot be based on the representation of their past body:
if A.Z., who is born with no arms and legs, experiences her body as normal and
can learn to count on her phantom fingers, it is not because one day her body
had been normal (Brugger et al, 2000). Similarly, we need another explanation
to understand how a woman can experience the feeling of having four phantom
legs, in addition to her two actual paralyzed legs (Vuilleumier et al, 1997), and
more generally how people can feel the presence of supernumerary limbs.
2 For a complete review, see Ramachandran and Hirstein (1998).
3 20% of aplasic people have phantom limbs according to Melzack et al (1997)
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The body and its representation are two different things. In the phenomenon
of phantom limb, the body disappears but not its representation, whereas in the
phenomenon of deafferentation, the body representation is disturbed while the
body still exists. Even if we have the intuition that the existence of our own
body is a transparent fact, sometimes we have to discover that we are amputated,
or that we are not amputated, or even that we get a new body part, as in transplants.
These kinds of knowledge are different. Indeed, it doesn’t seem plausible that
we need to constantly rediscover that our body is intact. Unlike the continuity of
the body presence, the loss of a body part, as well as transplantation of new
parts, appear as a rupture. We’ll focus here on the knowledge of the modification
of the body, rather than on the knowledge of the continuous presence of the
body. However, we should keep in mind that these two kinds of knowledge are
intrinsically related.
The Proprioceptive Phantom
Deafferented patients – if they don’t see their body – as well as amputated
ones do not receive any tactile, proprioceptive, and visual information about
a part of their body. However, this sensory loss doesn’t have the same
consequences in both cases: deafferented patients feel as if they are amputated
while real amputated patients feel as if their limb is still there. In 1911–1912,
Head and Holmes postulated the existence of a “body schema,” a dynamic internal
model of body posture generated by a constant flow of sensory inputs. If such
a body representation exists, the deprivation of any sensory information relative
to a certain part of the body should result in a modification of the body schema.
But the illusion of phantom limb shows that it is not as simple as that. It seems
that the representation of the body does not reflect the extinction of proprioception
and vision of the amputated limb and that the representation of the phantom
limb is not based on this information.
More exactly, people with phantom limb do not pretend to see their absent
limb. What they report is that they internally feel the limb, its position, its
temperature, its pain. Consequently, the phantom limb seems to have its source
from interoception, that is, the inner perception of one’s own body. But how is it
possible if there is no more interoceptive information relative to the absent limb?
Reflexive and Instrumental Proprioception
Interoception (proprioception, nociception, sense of temperature, sense of
balance, etc.) allows me to permanently know the position and the state of my
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own body, even if my eyes are closed. O’Shaughnessy (1995) makes a distinction
between reflexive (or introspective) proprioception and instrumental proprioception.
When I voluntarily pay attention to a body part, I use proprioceptive information
reflexively: I become conscious that my legs are crossed by a deliberate act of
reflection about the sate of my body. But I am not permanently conscious or
attentive to the state of my own body. Most of the time, I use proprioceptive
information in an instrumental mode, that is, for the purpose of execution of action:
attention is focused on the goal of action rather than on body position. Indeed,
I constantly receive a flow of proprioceptive information about my body, which
allows me to plan, to execute and to control my actions: when I move, I need to
know second by second where my limbs are, whether my muscles are stretched,
whether I risk falling, and so on. In the absence of proprioception, people are no
longer able to control their movements. I.W., one of the deafferented patients,
reported that at the beginning of his deafferentation, he was not even able to sit by
himself and to remain seated. Even after 20 years, if there is no light, he cannot
turn in bed during the night. G.L., another patient, is still unable to walk even if
she is not paralyzed, because movements of her legs are far too complex for her to
control in the absence of proprioception. In summary, we constantly receive
proprioceptive information, which is necessary for action and for body perception,
and when we no longer receive it, we loose the control of our body. Given that,
how can we understand that the loss of proprioception seems to have no effect on
people with phantom limbs who experience the position of their phantom and who
are even sometimes able to move it?
Penfield Homonculus
We have to be careful not to consider the amputated limb by itself isolated
from the other parts of the body. The phantom limb can only be understood on
the background of the whole body: even if there is no proprioceptive information
from the absent limb, we still receive proprioceptive inputs from other parts of
the body, inputs that could explain phantom feelings. A first hypothesis is that
the source of the phantom limb is the irritation of the remaining nerve endings
in the stump, and indeed the stimulation of the stump can produce or increase
phantom sensations. However, phantom sensations do not disappear when the
stump is anaesthetized or amputated. Thus, we need to add to this peripheral
cause a more central cause, at the level of the representation of the body.
At the cortical level, there is a somatotopic map of the body, which associates
each part of the cortex to a part of the body resulting in the picture of an
“Homonculus” (Penfield, 1950). Two features of the Penfield Homonculus
constitute the basis of phantom limbs: the organization of the Homonculus (for
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instance, the cortical representation of the hand is contiguous to the cortical
representation of the face) and the plasticity of the body representation. Monkeys
show (i) a reduction of the cortical area dedicated to the body part when sensory
nerves of a certain part of the body are cut; (ii) an extension of the corresponding
cortical area when monkeys excessively use one finger (Merzenick et al, 1984).
The change is not only local, but it also influences the whole representation, the
face area extending on the hand area when the hand is amputated or deafferented.
That is what happens in the phenomenon of phantom limb in humans, which we
should define as a “ remapping ” of the Penfield Homonculus.
When your hand itches, you know where to scratch. But when it is your
phantom hand that itches, where do you scratch? Ramachandran and Hirstein
(1998) show that when the face is touched, the patient feels as if his face and his
phantom hand are simultaneously touched: the sensory nerves from the face (and
also the stump) have invaded the cortical area dedicated to the hand. In the same
way, there is a remapping at the level of the primary motor area, which is also
somatotopic (but to a lesser extent). Studies in functional MRI also provide
evidence of the activation of the neighbouring face area in sensorimotor cortex
when the subject imagines that he is moving his phantom hand (Lotze et al,
2001). The activation is correlated with the fact that the phantom is painful and
according to these authors, this reorganizational change may be the neural
correlate of phantom limb pain. In short, scratch your face when your phantom
hand is itching.
Sensory Mislocalization
Therefore, the phenomenon of phantom limb should be defined as a mislo-
calization of proprioceptive information: patients receive proprioceptive infor-
mation from other parts of the body and represent them as if their source is the
amputated limb. Bermudez (1998) explains that the content of proprioceptive
representation is dual: it is descriptive (description of the state of the body) and
spatial (representation of the state as a state of a certain body part). Similarly,
bodily sensations like pain are always localized in the body space: it is not only
a pain, it is a pain in my right hand. The body space should not be confounded
with the space of other objects. As Merleau-Ponty (1962, p. 114) puts it: “The
border of my body is a frontier that usual spatial relations do not cross.” We
should distinguish different body spaces, as we should distinguish different body
representations. However, for our actual purpose, all we need is the basic
conception that a sensation is located in a body part and that the body part can
move without the pain moving. That’s what Block (1983) notices when he says
that the following inference is not valid:
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I have a pain in my thumb.
My thumb is in my mouth.
Thus, I have a pain in my mouth.
He concludes that the term “in” cannot be understood here as a spatial
transitive relative and that phenomenal localization shows certain specific
characteristics. However, what this invalid inference really shows is rather that
the localization of bodily sensation is intentional (Tye, 1995). Indeed, in the
context of phenomenal localization, one cannot substitute one constituant (my
thumb in my mouth) by another co-referential constituent (my mouth) salva
veritate. Similarly, propositional attitudes are referentially opaque: I cannot
conclude from the fact that I want to be in the Town Hall and that the Town Hall
is in a ghetto, that I want to be in a ghetto. According to Tye, the intentional
nature of bodily sensation explains why phenomena such as phantom limbs exist.
In the case of a phantom hand, even if I feel it as a pain in my right hand, it is
not true that my right hand is painful given that it has been amputated. What is
false here is not the descriptive content, it is the spatial content. There is a pain,
but this pain is mislocalized.
However, could we really be mistaken about our bodily sensations? It seems
to be in contradiction to the thesis of privileged access to one’s own mental
states, and more particularly to one’s own bodily sensations. According to a strong
version of this thesis, my knowledge of my pain is such that I cannot believe
that I am in pain when I am not in pain (infallibility) and I cannot be in pain
without believing that I am in pain (omniscience). I do not have time here to
treat the classical debate about the infallibility of self-knowledge. Moreover, the
phenomenon of phantom pain does not inscribe itself in the very same
problematic. As I’ve already said, the problem is not the existence of the sensation,
the problem is its localization.
Nevertheless, the possibility of mislocalization depends on the intentional
status of bodily sensations. In other words, if one sustains that pain sensations
are pure phenomenal states that do not represent bodily states, then they cannot
misrepresent them. Conversely, if one sustains that bodily sensations have the
function to represent the state of the body, bodily sensations can be true or false.
For instance, according to PANIC theory (Poised Abstract Non- conceptual
Intentional Content) endorsed by Tye (1995), pain sensations are non-conceptual
sensory representations of body disorders that are based on information delivered
by nociceptors about the state of the body. In the same way, Bermudez (1998)
sustains a representational view of bodily sensations. Proprioceptive content can
be true or false, depending on the fact that the body is actually in the state
represented and on the fact that the state of the body is well localized. Moreover,
Bermudez also provides a functional account of proprioceptive content. The
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proprioceptive content is intimately related to action and more particularly, the
spatial content: it doesn’t help to take care of the hand that is not painful. Actions
are appropriate to the body part that hurts and if pain is mislocalized, the same
actions are no longer relevant. If we come back to the phenomenon of phantom
limb, we have seen that if the phantom hand itches, the appropriate action is to
scratch the face. Consequently, the representation of a phantom limb is a misrepre-
sentation of the body state, not at the level of the descriptive content, but at the
level of the spatial one.
According to the traditional view, phantom limbs are a kind of bodily
hallucination. There is no more limb in phantom sensations than there is a pink
elephant in visual hallucinations. However, the illusion of pink elephants has no
external component while phantom sensations are partly caused by physical events
in the external world: I experience my phantom hand being touched because my
face is touched. Therefore, rather than a pure hallucination, we should interpret
phantom limbs as a case of sensory mislocalization. Nevertheless, the hypothesis
of remapping of the Penfield Homonculus cannot account for all phantom
sensations and the phenomenon of phantom limb depends on various factors,
such as the reactivation of body representation stored in long-term memory. We
have seen what would be the basis of phantom sensations and we are going to
see now what would be able to chase them out.
The Visible Phantom: Visuo-proprioceptive Conflict
The illusion of amputation in deafferented patients does not resist the vision
of their own body. However, the illusion of phantom limb in amputated patients
does resist the vision of the absence of their limb. We have seen the importance
of proprioceptive information, but now the question is to understand the role of
vision in the knowledge of body existence.
Despite the fact that all the sensory modalities do not always provide the
same representation of the body, we tend to maintain consistency by the resolution
of sensory conflicts. For instance, Lackner (1988) produced illusory configurations
of the body by manipulating such conflicts. He showed that muscle vibrations
induced illusory movements: the vibration seemed to move the arm and if the
motion was resisted, the subject still felt as if he was moving. In addition, if the
subject was asked to grasp his nose while his arm seemed to move, he would
experience his nose as elongating, by much as 30 cm. This illusory configuration
was the solution of a sensori-motor conflict: the vibration gave to the subject the
illusion of a movement of extension, but the fact that the hand maintained contact
with the nose meant that the nose was also moving, and as the head was stationary,
it meant that the nose was elongating. There was no more conflict. But this
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solution was effective only if the subject did not see that his arm was not moving
because in this latter case, the conflict found another solution: despite what he
felt, the subject didn’t believe that his arm was moving and thus, he didn’t feel
as if his nose was elongating. In this example, we see that in the case of mismatch
between vision and proprioception, vision prevails. We believe more what we
see than what we feel.
Other experiments find the same result. Fourneret and Jeannerod (1998) asked
subjects to trace sagittal lines on a graphic tablet while they were given a visual
feedback projected from a computer screen on a mirror. In normal trials, the line
seen in the mirror exactly matched the traced lines. In perturbed trials, a bias
was introduced and subjects consistently displaced their hand in order to
compensate the bias. After each trial, they were asked in which direction they
thought their hand had moved. They showed poor consciousness of the signals
generated by their own movements and they tended to adhere to visual information
rather than to kinesthetic information. With another experimental device, Sirigu
et al (1999) asked apraxic patients to execute hand movements, while the visual
feedback they received about the movement was systematically manipulated. They
were required to decide whether the movement shown on the screen was their
own or not. They showed severe difficulties in recognizing their own movements
and they tended to believe what they saw rather than anything else. Two patients
overtly expressed their own surprise at how well they had executed the movement,
while in fact they failed to perform it. In other words, visual feedback given on
the screen became predominant constituting the unique information available for
conscious decision.
More generally, it is well established that we trust vision and give it priority,
and if there is any conflict with other sensory modalities, what we see prevails.
It is thus all the more surprising that illusions of phantom limb are not erased by
the fact that patients see that the limb does not exist. Another neuropsychological
phenomenon is also resistent to vision, that is, anosognosia. In the case of
anosognosia, patients feel as if they can move their arm while they are paralyzed,
whereas in the case of phantom limb, patients feel as if they have an arm while
they don’t have it any more. More generally, anosognosic patients suffer from
a certain deficit4 without any consciousness of this deficit. They can deny the
importance of their deficit (anosodiaphora) or deny that they have any problem.
In the latter case, if you ask the patient to move while he is paralyzed, he will
confabulate and explain that he doesn’t want to move. He can also pretend that
he has accomplished the desired movement while he can obviously see that his
4 The deficit can be visual, motor, verbal… but we are interested here only by anosognosia for
hemiplegia.
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arm has not moved at all. As in the phenomenon of phantom limb, they have the
illusion of movements despite the fact that they don’t see any movement.
We could try to extend theoretical explanations of anosognosia to the
phenomenon of phantom limb. One hypothesis about anosognosia suggests that
the loss of sensory information is not phenomenologically salient and has to be
discovered by observation and inference (Levine et al, 1991). However, this theory
of “discovery” cannot be applied to the phenomenon of phantom limb for two
reasons. First, we have seen that the phenomenon of phantom limb cannot be
defined as a sensory loss, it is rather a problem of sensory mislocalization. Second,
while anosognosic patients really believe that they move, patients with phantom
limbs only feel “as if” they move, but do not believe that they actually move nor
do they believe that their phantom limb is real. Their problem is that their
theoretical knowledge does not suffice to erase the illusion.
At this level, we should make a distinction between two levels of perception:
object perception (the child sees a cat) and fact perception (the child sees that
there is a cat) (Dretske, 1995). When I see a cat, there is a primary level where
I just see the cat without recognizing or naming what I see. At this low level,
there is something it is like to see the cat but I do not identify the cat as a cat.
That’s what Dretske calls the level of object perception (or non-epistemic
perception). Object perception constitutes the basis of fact perception (or epistemic
perception). Fact perception is the perception that the object O has a certain
property P. At this level, I recognize what I see and I can also misrecognize it.
In this conceptual framework, we can provide two interpretations of the
resistance of the proprioceptive illusion of phantom limb to vision. First, we can
understand it as the consequence of the encapsulation of object perception. The
persistency of illusion despite contradictory beliefs is a well-known phenomenon
in visual illusions. In the illusion of Muller-Lyer, even if one knows perfectly
that both lines have the same size, one cannot help feeling as if one line is
longer than the other. Indeed, the visual illusion results from encapsulated visual
processing that cannot be influenced by higher order beliefs. Similarly, the illusion
of phantom limb should be understood as the output of early stages of
proprioceptive and tactile processing. The level of non-epistemic proprioception
(the “what it is like” to have a phantom limb) and the level of epistemic vision
(the visual belief that one is amputated) cannot communicate.
However, we have also to describe the relation between non-epistemic
vision and non- epistemic proprioception. At this low level, there should be
a conflict between what patients see and what they feel, and unlike what usually
happens, patients do not seem to take into account what they see. Maybe we
could say that there is no plurimodal integration. In order to understand why,
we are going to see what happens when patients are confronted with the vision
of their phantom limb.
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Chasing the Phantom
Paralytic patients before amputation have learnt that their intentions to
move are not followed by actual movements. Consequently, even after
amputation, the brain still thinks that the phantom limb is frozen in the prior
position. For suppressing the paralysis, Ramachandran and Rogers-
Ramachandran (1996) have invented a virtual reality box that provides to
patients the missing visual feedback of the phantom hand in movement. A mirror
is placed vertically so that the mirror reflection of the intact hand is
“superimposed” on the felt position of the phantom hand; when the intact hand
moves, the mirror reflects a moving contralateral hand. This experimental device
induced the illusion of phantom movements in six of ten patients, even if the
phantom hand had been paralyzed for ten years. It allowed certain patients to
unclench their painful hand. Moreover, for three patients, the tactile stimulation
of the intact hand induced a sensation of touch at the level of the phantom
hand. Interestingly, the tactile sensation increased when patients saw their
phantom hand being touched. It also influenced the presence of the phantom
limb itself. Indeed, a patient whose phantom finger disappeared 28 years ago
felt again his phantom finger with the mirror box. Conversely, a repeated
practice of simple movements in the box during three weeks suddenly induced
the complete dissolution of D.S.’s phantom arm.
We should notice here that these phenomena occur even if the normal hand
put into the box belongs to the experimenter. It means that patients do not just
transpose proprioceptive information from the intact limb to the contralateral
absent limb. Pure visual feedback plays an important role and allows (1) phantom
movements, (2) phantom tactile sensations, (3) reappearance and disappearance
of phantom limb.
Ramachandran’s mirror box reveals the following paradox: what chases out
the phantom is not the vision of the absence of the limb, but rather the vision of
the phantom limb. With the mirror box, as visual inputs become consistent with
proprioceptive inputs (there is a hand in such position), we could expect that
this consistency reinforces the illusion and indeed it induces phantom movements,
tactile sensations and even the reappearance of a phantom finger. However, it
has also the opposite effect, the extinction of the representation of D.S.’s phantom
arm. How can we explain this result?
Before trying to formulate some hypotheses, I’d like to focus on another
case of dissolution of phantom limbs occurring after hand transplant. Giraux et
al. (2001) describe the case of D.C. who underwent amputation of both hands in
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1996 and who felt painless phantom hands.5 Four years later, he was given two
new hands. Progressively, he has regained his sensitivity and his motricity. At
the level of the somatosensory representation, Giraux et al. show a shifting of
the representation of the hand, the hand winning back lost ground suffered during
amputation. This shift proves the late reversibility of the reorganization of the
Penfield Homonculus following amputation: the new hands restore what was
lost in body representation. The new flesh and blood hands have quickly replaced
the phantom hands and D.C. began to recognize his new hands as his own before
he regained his complete sensitivity and motricity. Different factors can explain
this fast integration of the new hands: (i) cortical plasticity, (ii) micro-movements
made very quickly after the operation, (iii) vision of the hands. Relative to this
latter point, D.C. is in the same situation as if he has put his hands in the mirror
box, but in his case what he sees is reality. Another difference is that in the case
of the graft, the phantom disappears, but not the representation of the hand,
while in the case of the mirror box, the phantom and the hand representation
disappear.
Knowledge with Observation of One’s Own Body
Ramachandran and Blakeslee (1998) assert that D.S. was “the first
amputation of a phantom limb,” an amputation allowed by the vision of the
phantom limb in movement. However, we should be more cautious. Indeed,
D.S. still had phantom fingers that he felt near the shoulder. In addition,
Ramachandran describes only one case and nothing guarantees that the
disappearance of the phantom actually depended on the utilization of the mirror
box. Thus, we can wonder about the effective role of vision in this amputation.
Nevertheless, keeping in mind these limits, it seems to me interesting to try to
analyze the effect of vision on phantom limbs.
One hypothesis could be that the mirror box and the graft allow visual
feedback to play again a role in body representation. The idea is that most of the
time, amputated patients do not confront proprioceptive and visual information
together. Even if vision is processing the same portion of objective space as
proprioception,6 visual and proprioceptive inputs are not “about” the same object.
Indeed, vision does not carry information about a body part, but only about what
is visible at the place where the hand no longer exists. Conversely, proprioception
5 More particularly, D.C. reported the feeling of putting on gloves when putting on his prothesis,
and he was able to count his phantom fingers and to move them.
6 For instance, the area beyond the elbow in the extension of the arm.
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concerns only the body. Therefore, there is no reason why what we see should
be compared with what we feel. As there is no conflict, there is no attempt to
resolve the conflict. In other words, when the messages from vision and
proprioception are too different, there cannot be any communication between
them. Therefore, there are only conflicts and resolutions of conflicts when sensory
representations have the same intentional object – when they are about the same
thing, that is, about the body. It does not suffice to occupy the same place in
objective space, it has also to be localized in body space.
On the other hand, cases in which both proprioceptive and visual information
concern the body initiate a new dialogue between them. That’s what the
phenomenon of brachial plexus shows. People who have sustained a brachial plexus
avulsion are partly paralyzed, but they also experience the feeling of having
a phantom arm fixed in a different position than the real arm. What is interesting
is that they are confronted with a conflict between the seen position of the real
arm and the felt position of the phantom arm, a conflict that they try to solve by
putting their real paralyzed arm in the same position as the phantom arm.
Conversely, with the mirror box and the graft, visual inputs match
proprioceptive inputs. With the repeated utilization of the mirror box, we may
speculate that the consistency creates expectancies about the presence of a visual
hand: the subject gets used to comparing what he feels with what he sees and
this comparison leads to a visuo-proprioceptive conflict outside the mirror box.
The solution of the conflict is to give supremacy to visual information and to
inhibit proprioceptive information so that the phantom limb disappears:
However, if the device is used for a long time, the resulting flood of conflicting
sensory information (e.g. from vision versus proprioception), may cause the signals
from the limb to be “gated” so that the arm disappears. (Ramachandran and Rogers-
Ramachandran, 1996, p. 382).
In the case of the graft, the consistency between visual and proprioceptive
information reinforces the representation of the hand. We should notice that the
persistency of hand representation through the presence of phantom hands allows
D.C. to integrate more easily the new hands. Otherwise without phantom hands,
it would have taken more time for the patient to adopt his new hands and to
generate a new hand representation.
This is pure speculation. However, it seems clear that we have to be careful
for our understanding of body knowledge to take into account vision as well as
proprioception. It seems that the knowledge of one’s own body is far from being
a “knowledge without observation” (Anscombe, 1959). According to Anscombe,
we directly know the position of our body without any observation, in the same
way that we know our own intentions: I do not need to observe my hand raising
in order to know that I intend to raise my arm; similarly, I do not need to observe
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my legs crossed in order to know that they are crossed. Indeed, I can know the
position of my legs without looking at them. What distinguishes the knowledge
of my own body from the knowledge of another’s body is internal perception
(I have a proprioceptive access only to my own body). Nevertheless, internal
perception does not exhaust the characterization of the knowledge of one’s own
body and we should not forget that most of the time, it depends on the integration
of proprioceptive and visual information.7
The question now is to determine at which level vision intervenes. Till now
I have talked about body representations without mentioning the different kinds
of such representations. Gallagher (1995) makes a distinction between body image
and body schema. A simplified version of this distinction would characterize the
body image as a conceptual conscious representation of the body and the body
schema as a non-conceptual sensory-motor representation of the body. On this
interpretation, vision might be said to play a role mostly at the conscious level
of body image whereas instrumental proprioception is considered as part of the
basis of body schema. For instance, vision allows me to recognize myself in the
mirror and proprioception allows me to grasp the glass in front of me. According
to Gallagher and Cole (1995), the loss of proprioception would even result in
the loss of the body schema in deafferented patients. However, we should not
assimilate the distinction between body image and body schema to the distinction
between vision and proprioception. Reflexive proprioception influences the body
image and vision plays an important role in the body schema. In Fourneret and
Jeannerod’s experiment, subjects compensated to the visual bias even if they
were not conscious of doing so. This sensori-motor adjustment resulted from the
comparison between the efferent copy of the motor command and visual feedback.
There would have been no adjustment if they had compared the efferent copy
with the proprioceptive feedback because there would have been no discrepancy
between both signals.
But do we want to say that this sensori-motor use of visual information is
identical to the use that is involved in mirror recognition? We have seen that
O’Shaughnessy distinguishes instrumental and reflexive proprioception. I suggest
that we could also apply this distinction to vision. Instrumental vision would be
the unconscious flow of visual feedback about the position of one’s own body in
movement, while reflexive vision would be the conscious use of visual
information that provides semantic information about one’s own body. In other
words, in Milner and Goodale’s terminology (1995), there is a vision for action
and a vision for recognition. This latter distinction is usually applied to external
7 Graziano (1999) finds in the monkey some neurons in the premotor cortex that are activated
by both kinds of information.
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objects but we can extend it for body perception. Indeed, by definition vision for
action encodes the relation between the agent and the goal. Therefore, it encodes
both the goal and the body of the agent.
We should not confound instrumental vision with Gibson’s notion of visual
kinesthesis. Through visual kinesthesis, visual experiences about the external
world generated by motion are decoded so that subjects perceive that they are
moving:
Vision is kinesthetic in that it registers movements of the body just as much as does
the muscle joint skin system and the inner ear system. Vision picks up both
movements of the whole body relative to the ground and movement of a member of
the body relative to the whole.” (Gibson, 1979, p. 183).
So, visual kinesthesis is primarily about the external world and it makes
available information about the movement of the perceiver by computations made
on the basis of the optic flow, whereas instrumental vision directly concerns the
movement of one’s own body.
In summary, I agree with Anscombe if she means that we do rarely use
vision for identification. But I do not agree with her if she means that we do not
appeal to instrumental visual information about our own body and visual
kinesthesis that both belong to the body schema.8 However, one can say that
instrumental vision is not a case of observational knowledge, but rather a case of
pragmatic knowledge, a “know how.” Vision intervenes in the detection of body
position but also in the knowledge of body existence. However, in order to be
able to influence body representation, visual inputs need to be about the body
and not about the place where the body was.
Finally, I’d like to point out the importance of action in the dissolution of
phantom limbs. Indeed, D.S. ceased to feel his phantom arm because he was
moving his phantom in the mirror box. Monitoring of action allows comparisons
between visual feedback and efferent copy, which leads to the disappearance of
the phantom limb. Thus, action makes it possible for visual information to play
its role in the knowledge of body existence.
The aplasic phantom
We have seen how somatosensory remapping induces the feeling of phantom
limbs. However, we may wonder how this hypothesis could account for the
8 We can even suggest that in the absence of proprioception, deafferented patients can rely on
this kind of instrumental vision for guiding their actions.
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existence of phantom limbs in aplasic patients, given that they have never received
any tactile or proprioceptive information about the absent body part. There are
three alternatives9. According to Merleau-Ponty (1962), the body schema is the
product of development and in the absence of any sensory information, the
representation of the absent limb has never been able to develop. In other words,
as the absence of the limb is congenital, the Penfield Homonculus reflects this
absence since the beginning: there has never been any somatosensory
representation of the limb and aplasic people cannot have phantom limbs.
However, it has been shown now that aplasic people do experience phantom
limbs (Melzack 1990, 1992). Therefore, we need to provide another explanation.
The second alternative consists in appealing to another source of sensory
information. If phantom limbs cannot exist without sensory information and if
phantom limbs do exist while there is no sensory information about one’s own
body, then phantom limbs are based on the observation of the bodies of other
people. However, we can also suggest a third possible reply: it is not necessary
to receive sensory inputs for constructing the body schema. Knowledge of the
body is not only empirical, it is also innate.
Shared representations of the body
One explanation is to appeal once again to vision, not the vision of one’s
own body but the vision of the body of other people. Even if aplasic patients
have never seen their limb, still they have been able to observe the body of other
people around them. We have seen that the vision of the experimenter’s hand in
the mirror box sufficed to induce illusory movements of the phantom hand.
Moreover, there is a network of human brain activation common to simulation,
execution and observation of actions.10 Rizzolatti et al (1996) have also found
that the same mirror neurons in the area 6 fire whether a monkey is observing
a specific movement or executing it. Thus, it means that doing an action and
observing it activate the same internal representation of action. Appealing to this
theory, Brugger et al (2000) emphasize the importance of the observation of
actions performed by others for the existence of phantom movements in aplasic
people: the representation of someone moving would allow the representation of
oneself moving. We can extend this idea of action representations shared between
9 For a review of the debate about the existence of innate body schema, see Gallagher and
Meltzoff (1996).
10 The inferior parietal lobule (area 40), part of the supplementary motor area and the ventral
premotor area (Decety et al 1997).
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oneself and the others to body representations. For instance, in the phenomenon
of facial imitation, one needs to map from visual information of the body of
someone else to proprioceptive information about one’s own body. Thus, in order
to do so, one needs to have a common undifferentiated representation that
describes one’s own body and the body of others. In aplasic people, the absence
of somatosensory information about the absent limb would be compensated by
visual information about the body of other people.
However, I’d like to point out two difficulties in this hypothesis. First, this
kind of explanation doesn’t account for the precise content of the illusion. If the
phantom limb reflects the limb of other people, it should be normal and this is
not the case: the phantom limb could be too short or the arm could be
“telescoped.”11 Second, maybe observation of other people can compensate the
loss of sensory information about one’s own body, but can it compensate the
complete absence of sensory information? In other words, the representation of
other people is not necessarily sufficient to construct the representation of oneself.
Consequently, aplasic patients need to already have a representation of their own
body in order to be able to use visual information about the body of other people;
as they have never received any sensory input about their own body, this
representation has to be innate.
An innate representation of the body
Neonates show various abilities that tend to confirm the existence of an
innate body representation. It has been shown that very young infants are able to
imitate some simple movements like protrusion of tongue. According to Meltzoff
and Moore (1999), an innate system of active intermodal mapping (AIM) makes
facial imitation possible in neonates. Indeed, facial imitation requires one to map
visual information to a motor schema based on an innate representation of the
face in order to reproduce on one’s own face the movement that is seen on the
other’s face. In addition, it has been shown that the infant’s mouth “anticipates”
the arrival of the hand in hand-to-mouth movements. According to Gallagher et
al. (1998), this hand-mouth coordination, which can be found in utero and in
early infancy, provides evidence of an innate motor schema. The same innate
motor schema would also partly explain the existence of phantom limbs in aplasic
patients: the hand is represented in the innate schema of the mouth-hand
coordination despite the lack of the hand.
11 When the fingers are next to the elbow for instance.
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Based on the study of phantom limbs in aplasic people, Melzack (1990, 1992,
and 1997) also proposes that there is an innate structure of body representation,
the “neuromatrix.” The idea is that sensory inputs are not sufficient in themselves
to construct body representations, they can only become integrated into a pre-
existing neuromatrix. Roughly, the innate body representation could be compared
to a form such as “right arm, left arm, right leg, left leg, etc.,” and sensory
information would give a content to each box. In the absence of any sensory
information, the innate body representation would still endure. According to
Melzack, the neuromatrix is a neural network that includes the sensory pathways
(from thalamus to somatosensory cortex), the limbic system associated with emotion
and motivation, and the parietal lobe, which is necessary for the sense of ownership
of the body. The neuromatrix replies to the sensory inputs and continuously
generates a “neurosignature,” that is, a specific pattern that indicates that (1) the
body is intact, and (2) the body belongs to the subject. The information is shared
between the three systems and converted into an integrated output. If the
neuromatrix is only associated with the neurosignature without any peripheral
information, the subject would feel the presence of a phantom limb.
We should notice that Gallagher and Melzack slightly differ in their
conceptions of innate body representations and aplasic phantoms. Indeed,
Gallagher sustains the existence of an innate body schema12 while Melzack tends
to describe an innate body image, which is both perceptual and emotional.
Moreover, unlike Melzack, Gallagher enphasizes the importance of the
reorganization of the neuromatrix, a reorganization similar to the remapping of
the Penfield Homonculus. This reorganization in prenatal development can be
more or less dramatic and it is only in the case where it is partial that aplasic
phantoms appear.13 For my part, I think that both body schema and body image
can be partly innate. Relative to the question of reorganization, it would be
interesting to know whether aplasic people scratch their face when their phantom
hand itches.
The illusion of phantom limb would remain a mystery if we describe the
brain as a passive receptor of sensory information. What we need to understand is
that body representation is not the simple reflection of peripheral inputs, it is rather
the result of an active process of integration of afferent information (vision,
proprioception, touch, etc.) and efferent signals such as efferent copies of motor
commands. Such integration can require resolving conflicts between the different
kinds of inputs and what we see prevails on what we feel as long as the intentional
12 Gallagher and Meltzoff (1996) also admit the possibility of an innate body image.
13 Otherwise, it results in the absence of aplasic phantom as it is the case in 80% of aplasic
people (Melzack, 1990).
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object of visual information is the body itself. More than a body representation,
we should talk of a construction of the body, a construction based on an innate
structure. Thus, the knowledge of body existence is both innate and empirical,
visual and proprioceptive, fallible and easily influenced. Maybe this paper offers
more questions than replies but it shows that we need to give up the idea of the
knowledge of the existence of our own body as a primitive fact immediately given.
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